THE PREVENT STRATEGY: 
A CRADLE TO GRAVE POLICE-STATE
About CAGE

CAGE is an independent advocacy organisation working to empower communities impacted by the War on Terror. By promoting due process, the vision of the organisation is to see a return to respect for those fundamental norms which transcend religion, societies and political theories.

CAGE has been campaigning against the War on Terror for more than a decade. Its work has focussed on working with survivors of abuse and mistreatment across the globe. Its website is one of the leading resources documenting the abuse of due process and the erosion of the rule of law in the context of the War on Terror. CAGE has delivered more than 750 lectures across the UK, produced cutting edge reports and provided a voice to survivors of the War on Terror through its media work.

The UK government’s PREVENT policy is a central part of the domestic War on Terror that is impacting Muslim communities. It is arguably regarded as the leading blueprint for counter-terrorism policy across the world. CAGE became increasingly alarmed at the absence of due process, the manner in which basic rights are being eroded and the atmosphere of secrecy prevailing amongst many institutions in regard to Muslims. As a result, CAGE published “Good Muslim Bad Muslim” in 2011, in response to the revised PREVENT Strategy. It has become imperative for CAGE to focus future work on responding to the negative impact of PREVENT policy.
Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Critical Analysis of Policy and Proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Schools and Young People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Prevent and Healthcare Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Security, Surveillance, Recruitment and Entrapment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Terror Laws and Judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Travel and Schedule 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Universities and Conference Venues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Mosques and Charities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Citizenship Deprivation and Passport Removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Financial Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Prevent: A Danger to Fundamental British Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Endnotes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the London bombings in July 2005, the British government under the CONTEST strand of its anti-terrorism strategy, created a taskforce to prevent “Violent Muslim Extremism”. Many Muslim representatives and leaders joined the British government in their quest to tackle “Muslim Extremism” in order to disassociate themselves from acts of political violence. This gave licence to the government to create PREVENT, the first all-encompassing social policy targeting almost every aspect of Muslim life. PREVENT has undergone a number of revisions, both in 2011, and the newest revised proposal, launched in December 2013.

In 2005, critical voices predicted that PREVENT would lead to widespread curtailment of the freedoms and rights of Muslims. They warned PREVENT, combined with the new terror laws, would set precedents making legitimate Muslim behaviour and activity unlawful, thus creating a two-tier system of law. This is precisely what has happened.

Ironically, some of those who were invited to the taskforce classed as “moderates” have subsequently been declared “extremists” as a consequence of the policy. The criticisms of the policy by those labelled as “extremists” have now become main-stream in the Muslim community.

Muslims are now feeling the full weight of PREVENT as it is negatively impacting on all aspects of their daily life. The consequences of PREVENT policy implementation are not being recorded or shared between Muslims. CAGE’s publication “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim” presented a critique of PREVENT and some actions for Muslims. This is an update to that paper, highlighting what is happening on the ground on the basis of information provided to CAGE from the community and other sources.

The report incorporates some analysis of the 2013 proposals, and is structured to include action points for all those concerned at the targeting of Muslim life by PREVENT.

It is hoped that through regular CAGE briefing reports on PREVENT, the Muslim and wider community will become more aware of the problems that the policy is raising and how we can respond as a community. The framework that has been created presents a danger to the civil liberties of all members of British Society and a strategy is required by the whole of civil society to prevent a disproportionate interference with fundamental rights and freedoms.
Critical Analysis of Policy and Proposals

2.1 Before examining the impact of PREVENT on the ground, it is worth reiterating key criticisms of PREVENT from “Good Muslim Bad Muslim.” The current proposals build on previous PREVENT policies and add yet another layer of restrictions and erosions of the rights and freedoms of Muslims.

2.2 PREVENT’s causal analysis and theory is fundamentally flawed. According to the strategy, the cause of violence in the Muslim world is rooted in ideology. Whereas in reality the cause is the political struggle of Muslims in response to unrepresentative regimes, often aided by Western policy and occupations.

2.3 PREVENT incorrectly conflates defeating an ideology (which it describes as “Islamism”) with defeating terrorism. All terrorists and acts of political violence have an ideology or goal. However, terrorism and political violence is not caused by ideology, it is a methodology. Rooting out an ideology or in this case a theology will not end Politically Motivated Violence (PMV) because it does not address the political causes. PREVENT focuses on dealing with religious and political ideology as a means of dealing with PMV. Instead of addressing the political struggles that lead to violence that need a solution.

2.4 Where the aim is to defeat PMV, the solution is presented as defeating an ideology. This mirrors the strategy adopted by the West to defeat Communism. This strategy was to marginalise, censor, outlaw and eliminate those who observed particular ideas and beliefs in order to discredit them and their views. This warped analysis of a new global ideological threat equivalent to Communism runs throughout PREVENT policy. Thus, PREVENT is a political programme not an anti-terror strategy. The following statement in the 2013 proposals sums it up succinctly.

“This is a distinct ideology which should not be confused with traditional religious practice. It is an ideology which is based on a distorted interpretation of Islam, which betrays Islam’s peaceful principles, and draws on the teachings of the likes of Sayyid Qutb. Islamist extremists deem Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a ‘war on Islam’, creating a narrative of ‘them’ and ‘us’. They seek to impose a global Islamic state governed by their interpretation of Shari’ah as state law, rejecting liberal values such as democracy, the rule of law and equality. Their ideology also includes the uncompromising belief that people cannot be Muslim and British, and insists that those who do not agree with them are not true Muslims.”1
2.5 The consequence is a policy which is no longer about stopping PMV but defeating Islamic "ideology". It views the works of some of the greatest contemporary Islamic scholars like Sayyid Qutb as equivalent to Karl Marx, and his Communist Manifesto, inspiring Muslims around the world "...to impose a global Islamic state governed by their interpretation of Shari'ah as state law, rejecting liberal values such as democracy, the rule of law and equality". The targeting of communists during the cold war and the injustices that occurred is an example of how a misconceived strategy can tarnish a particular section of society. All societies ought to be able to accommodate alternative political solutions and debate them in a civilised manner without resorting to intimidation or legal sanctions.

2.6 This narrative emanates from a neo-Conservative worldview, which appears to seek a global confrontation with the Muslim world. As a consequence, few Muslims are now prepared to cooperate with the Government’s task force and those that do, do so secretly.

2.7 The government notion that PMV is perpetrated by those against liberal values of equality and democracy, who supposedly believe one cannot be both Muslim and British, is incorrect. Many of those convicted of terrorism have been part of British society and embraced its values. It is neither the West nor its values that provoke violent action, but the perceived actions and policies of western countries in Muslim majority lands. They have made this repeatedly clear in their public statements.

2.8 The most obvious source for causal analysis of terrorism is those who have been convicted of the offence in Europe. Analysis of these people and their motivations would constitute a decent evidence base. Many of these even leave behind recordings stating the reason for their actions, or as in the case of the killing of soldier Lee Rigby, broadcast it live on TV. Without this kind of analysis, PREVENT policy lacks any empirical evidence base and merely delves into the speculative and political.

2.9 Teachers, doctors, police officers, civil servants and local government officers are effectively being trained and indoctrinated with a politicised understanding of Islam and Muslim political struggles being presented as some kind of expert analysis. They should not be made part of the surveillance state targeting a particular community.

2.10 Ironically, whilst the PREVENT strategy nowhere recognises foreign policy and western interventions as a motivator or cause of violence, it uses grievance and comments made about injustice, oppression and foreign policy as evidence of propensity to future violence (see indicators under Channel later in the report).

2.11 Muslims who propose an alternative narrative or political analysis for the causes of violence in the Muslim world are seen as extremist radicalisers, and as potential pathway to violence.

2.12 Thus, PREVENT is a strategy that seeks to eliminate alternative political discourse about western foreign policy amongst Muslims, even amongst children. It is a policy to silence Muslims and pacify/de-politicise their faith. In short it criminalises political dissent or alternative political thought.

2.13 The idea that Islamic theology is the cause of Muslim violence is not new. During the Crusades, Islam and its Prophet were blamed for violence in public, at a time when Muslims were defending their lands from Crusaders. During the British Raj in India, the uprisings in 1857 were not seen as a reaction to foreign occupation. Instead, the Hunter Commission (a 19th Century PREVENT theory) pointed the finger at Islamic theology and Wahhabi extremists, even though the key personality behind the uprisings was a charismatic Sufi.
The British Government has always been reluctant to look to its own violence and policies in the Muslim world for inspiring Muslim violence. As such it cannot be a neutral arbiter in analysing and dealing with conflicts, as it is itself all too often a party to them.

2.14 It is obvious that this flawed strategy will not end PMV, something highlighted by the killing of Lee Rigby highlights. The government strategy does not recognise that anti-terrorism policy is failing, but rather introduces more layers of law and restrictions that impact Muslim communities. This amounts to collective punishment of the whole for the actions of individuals.

2.15 PREVENT focuses on theology and ideology as causes of PMV, thus making Muslim beliefs the subject of suspicion, surveillance, misrepresentation and prosecution. When viewed in this context, the strategy can rightly be referred to as 21st century McCarthyism.

2.16 Although PREVENT is currently policy not law, when linked to terrorism laws and national security it has set precedents that make previously lawful activities suspicious and unlawful. There are limited grounds to challenge accusations or hold to account those making decisions that can have a serious affect on individuals. Furthermore, the new proposals include introduction of extremism orders and other measures that intend to make PREVENT theory into law. This will exacerbate the existing two tier system of law in the UK, one for Muslims and one for the rest.

2.17 The law does not define extremism, whereas violence and terrorism are both defined and considered unlawful. Without a legal definition of extremism there is wide scope for labelling anyone who disagrees with someone’s religious or political views as extremist. Consequently, those viewed as ‘extremists’, specifically the Muslim community, are denied equal access to jobs, facilities and services. The victim is marginalised by society, treated differently and denied an opportunity to defend themselves.

2.18 In line with the theory of PREVENT, the definition of extremism associates religious and political views with violence. The following definitions are used in PREVENT.

“Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas”.

“Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.”

“A radicaliser is an individual who encourages others to develop or adopt beliefs and views supportive of terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism”.

“Radicalising locations are venues, often unsupervised, where the process of radicalisation takes place. Locations include public spaces, for example university campuses and mosques, as well as private/more concealed locations such as homes, cafes, and bookstores”.

“Radicalising materials include literature or videos that are used by radicalisers to encourage or reinforcing individuals to adopt a violent ideology. Some of this material may explicitly encourage violence. Other materials may take no avowed position on violence but make claims to which violence is subsequently presented as the only solution.”
PREVENT has more to do with censorship and exclusion of certain political and religious views from public life, reforming peoples perceived ideas, beliefs and behaviours, than it has to do with violence.

Public sector officers have now become politicised, being tasked with decision-making based on a limited understanding of Islam and politics of the Muslim world, backed by people who have only become ‘experts’ due to government funding. In addition, hostile anti-Muslim websites and activists put pressure on institutions to ban events and exclude speakers by labelling them “hate preachers”.

This has led to widespread discrimination against Muslims based on unsubstantiated allegations about their political and religious beliefs.

After criticism by Muslims that the policy only applied to them, the 2011 policy in theory applied the term ‘extremism’ to other communities. However, in practice it is almost entirely applied to Muslims. All training materials and indicators of risk are entirely to do with Islam and Muslims.

The British government, advised primarily by those who are inclined toward neo-conservatism, are re-defining what constitutes genuine Islam. This idea that a British government can interfere with, define and regulate the Islamic faith and ideology is insulting to Muslims. It further highlights the flawed foundation upon which the PREVENT policy is built.

The policy encompasses almost all aspects of Muslim life, and targets all generations, in essence a cradle to grave surveillance state.

The state is encroaching on every aspect of Muslim life, with people being labelled, discriminated against, and prosecuted for their ideas and beliefs (often by panels, committees, and individuals). Moreover, there are no legitimate safeguards for Muslims to challenge these decisions or for the community to officially scrutinise its impact.

The PREVENT policy is shrouded in secrecy, with no mechanisms to challenge decisions and inaccurate labelling as ‘extremist’. There is no review mechanism for public scrutiny or monitoring of how the policy is being applied. Public service officers hide behind the smoke screen of ‘security’ to refuse access to information and reasons for decisions.

PREVENT is a shifting strategy: it started off initially talking about Muslim violent extremism, then it dealt with violence; onto extremism; and now radicalism. The new shift (2013 proposals) is indicative of the focus of the Extremism Taskforce’s report “Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism”. The focus is now ideology rather than violence. Radicalisation first, rather than extremism, a term which is susceptible to even wider application and misuse than before.

“We have been too reticent about challenging extreme Islamist ideologies in the past, in part because of a misplaced concern that attacking Islamist extremism equates to an attack on Islam itself. This reticence, and the failure to confront extremists, has led to an environment conducive to radicalisation in some mosques and Islamic centres, universities and prisons”.

The new proposals, with the 2011 definition of extremism, mirror this shift. Initially the aim was to eliminate those groups, speakers and individuals who talked about Islamic politics,
particularly in the Muslim world. The 2011 version extended censorship from public life to groups/individuals who preached religious beliefs deemed inconsistent with the 2011 definition. It also talked about dealing with Al Qaeda and like minded individuals, potentially encompassing a wide range of non-violent activists and preachers who have never committed any crime here or overseas.

The 2013 proposals seek to criminalise and remove from public life and religious discourse the very ideas and views believed to constitute radicalism. This means dealing with groups and people, as well as Muslim views on women, separate seating at Muslim events held at university, homosexuality, shari'ah, Islamic views on human rights and Islamic states in Muslim lands.

Consequently, this involves proscribing and outlawing the ideas of prominent scholars and thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Mawdudi, and removing alleged radical ideas from the internet, possibly even the stocking of certain books. This is clear censorship and a disproportionate interference by the state in the private affairs of individuals.

The 2013 proposals cast the net much further than the initial list of individuals and groups. They focus on mosques, possibly with restrictive orders for those who are found “guilty” of radicalisation. Muslim groups, charities, websites and organisations that are deemed radical could be served with orders, stopping them from holding or carrying out certain key functions, effectively crippling them; a ban through the back door.

Individuals deemed to be promoters of radical ideas will have orders placed on them, making it unlawful to speak at universities, charities, mosques, public meetings or even publishing views on the internet. It will therefore be lawful for universities and event venues to stop people speaking without breaching their own codes on freedom of expression. Again, this is effectively a ban through the back door and overseas speakers will also be affected by this. Furthermore, this is contradictory and inconsistent with the value of freedom of expression.

Recognising that PREVENT was only a policy, the 2014 proposals intend to make PREVENT lawful. Authorities will be legally obliged to apply PREVENT and the Channel Programme. PREVENT will become law without offering any of the safeguards of the law and due process to the Muslim community.

PREVENT and its extra judicial procedures, panels and decisions, are becoming policies similar to those implemented during the McCarthy era in the United States in the 1950’s, against those accused of having links, associations, beliefs or affiliations to communist ideas.

During the McCarthy era, thousands of Americans were accused of being communists or communist sympathizers, therefore becoming the subject of aggressive investigations and questioning before government or private-industry panels, committees and agencies. Suspicions were often given credence despite inconclusive or questionable evidence, and the level of threat posed by a person’s real or supposed leftist associations or beliefs was often greatly exaggerated. Many people suffered discrimination, loss, and prosecution as a result of extra-legal procedures that later came into general disrepute.

The PREVENT policy gives legitimacy to discrimination against Muslims for holding political religious views that those in authoritative roles may disagree with, or, that draw attention to the impacts of western foreign policy. It gives credibility to trial and discrimination by committees and panels similar to those of the McCarthy era.
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1:** Campaign against new proposals
  - **Action Step:** Create awareness through social media
  - **Action Step:** Seminar on current impact and proposals

- **AIM 2:** Promote alternative narrative to PREVENT theory.
  - **Action Step:** Research and write alternative narrative
  - **Action Step:** Market and promote narrative

- **AIM 3:** Challenge the policy as a whole.
  - **Action Step:** Legal advice under articles of Human Rights Conventions or Judicial Review in High Court.
  - **Action Step:** Take UK Government to European Court
The PREVENT policy introduced the Channel programme in 2007 to identify early on those considered “vulnerable” or, “at risk” of being drawn towards extremism or violence. The Channel programme provides collaboration between the Police and other agencies such as schools and youth workers in identifying and referring individuals and carrying out de-radicalising interventions. Those referred are assessed by a multi-agency panel, which decides what type of intervention is needed, if any.

Identification of those at risk is based on a series of indicators and behaviours, set out in guidance and reinforced and elaborated upon at training.

The primary focus of Channel has been young people at school and further education aged between 15 and 24 but children of much younger age have also been referred.

The Channel programme has also been extended to the health sector with healthcare professionals being able to refer “at risk” individuals. This is discussed in the next chapter.

ACPO figures highlight a steady increase in Channel referrals between April 2007 to 31 March 2013 (see chart below). This increase was inevitable given the wide scope of indicators provided by the guidance.  

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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>REFERRALS</th>
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<tr>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008/2009</td>
<td>179</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009/2010</td>
<td>467</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>599</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>580</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012/2013</td>
<td>748</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,653</td>
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3.6 During the period in question, 930 referrals (35%) were of people under 18 years of age. It is not known how many were under 15 years of age. This indicates that young people are being unnecessarily referred, and the programme has been rightly called anti-Islamic.4

3.7 Of the 2653 referrals only 587 were actually assessed, meaning 78% of referrals did not need any assessment. This indicates that the policy lacks clarity and is far too widely applied, as well as creating an unfounded atmosphere of suspicion surrounding the Muslim youth communities.

3.8 The indicators of risk include simple expressed opinions, behavioural changes, increased religiosity, personal history and support for certain causes. The ambiguous definitions and loose understanding of Islamic political causes has inevitably led more people to be viewed with suspicion. Muslims are being referred simply due to their religious or political views that pose no danger to society. There have been a number of cases of Muslim school children being reported simply for making innocent or unprovocative comments after hearing TV news regarding the Muslim world. The following extracts from the guidance highlights the loose nature of indicators and the scope for those in authority to stereotype and discriminate.

### Engagement - With a group cause or ideology
- Feelings of grievance and injustice
- Feeling under threat
- A need for identity, meaning and belonging
- A desire for status
- A desire for excitement and adventure
- A need to dominate and control others
- Susceptibility to indoctrination
- A desire for political or moral change
- Opportunistic involvement
- Family or friend’s involvement in extremism
- Being at a transitional time of life
- Being influenced or controlled by a group
- Relevant mental health issues

### Intent - To cause harm
- Intent - To cause harm
- Over-identification with a group or ideology
- ‘Them and Us’ thinking
- Dehumanisation of the enemy
- Attitudes that justify offending
- Harmful means to an end
- Harmful objectives

### Capability - To cause harm
- Individual knowledge, skills and competencies
- Access to networks, funding or equipment
- Criminal Capability5
The evidence emerging is that innocent statements and comments, as well as political beliefs are being used as indicators of extremism. For example, CAGE received a referral regarding a comment about the Taliban by a school pupil. In another case, an individual was reported for possessing an Islamic CD of a Sufi scholar talking on purely spiritual aspects of Islam at a UK port. Enquiries were made with his GP regarding his vulnerability to radicalism. Other cases have been reported in the media as below:

“In a college in northern England, a student who attended a meeting about Gaza was reported by one lecturer as a potential extremist. He was found not to be”.

“A nine-year-old schoolboy in east London, who was referred to the authorities after allegedly showing signs of extremism – the youngest case known in Britain. He was “deprogrammed” according to a source with knowledge of the case”.

“In Blackburn, at least 80 people were reported to the authorities for showing signs of extremism. They were referred to the Channel project, part of PREVENT”.

The monitoring of young people and particularly school children, with different religious or political attitudes to the mainstream, is worrying and more akin to what happens under the Assad regime in Syria, with children who make comments opposed to the regime being sent off for correction.

A research paper detailing referrals is needed in order to highlight the subjective and anti-Islamic nature of this programme.

Other local authority policies for safeguarding vulnerable people and protection are usually public and incorporate rights of appeal. The Channel procedure is secretive and ambivalent, with parents and community members kept in the dark regarding the intrusion of their privacy. Without access to information on how Channel operates internally, it is difficult to challenge the policy or protect the rights of individuals.

The training being provided for individuals within institutions such as schools and colleges on how to identify those at risk is secretive and not open to scrutiny by Muslims. We have been informed that a secrecy agreement has to be signed by attendees.

The work of the Preventing Extremism Unit in the DfE is not open to scrutiny or challenge. The Muslim community are not consulted on the implementation of the policy, the guidance issued or the advisors employed.

The individuals referred under Channel have no rights to legal or other representation, or to challenge the referral or its outcome. It is not known to what extent parents are being informed, if at all, about their children’s referral.

Equally worrying is what happens to names and information held about individuals. Are they removed from any Police and intelligence lists if there is no threat, or are all those referred destined to be on security lists forever, considered a potential radical and threat to national security?
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1**: Achieve openness and transparency in the operation of Channel.
  - **Action Step**: Write to local authorities and DFE demanding publications of how the policy is operating and access to training materials.
  - **Action Step**: Use Freedom of Information Requests if needed

- **AIM 2**: Make Muslim community aware of proposals.
  - **Action Step**: Publicise cases
  - **Action Step**: Local meetings and talks to discuss

- **AIM 3**: Achieve rights to representation, appeal and redress.
  - **Action Step**: Put pressure locally to change policies.
  - **Action Step**: Legal action in a case.
4.1 The extension of the Channel programme into the health sector has taken place gradually commencing in 2008. Initially it was adopted as a pilot in nine Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs). In January 2010 it covered areas of mental health, primary care, drug and alcohol programmes, prison health and school nursing.

4.2 Since 2011, PREVENT in the health sector has expanded to include work with charities, medical deaneries and the private health sector.

4.3 Guidance has been produced for the sector and the Home Office has produced PREVENT awareness-raising products (Health WRAP and Short Health WRAP DVD’s). Selected staff have been trained, and this is now becoming compulsory for all staff in some SHAs.

4.4 Most SHAs have incorporated Channel into their tackling vulnerability strategies that identify people at risk of medical and related social problems, such as mental health, drugs alcohol, abuse and prostitution. Although these latter issues incorporate social elements, primarily they are health issues. Extremism is not a medical health issue.

4.5 The guidance for the health sector identifies potential signs of vulnerability and indicators of propensity to terrorism related activities, as seen in the tables below. The factors associated with vulnerability are too general and there is high propensity to over/misdiagnosis risk. As many of the factors do not have a medical solution and require socio-economic or political "treatments" this is adding to a burgeoning workload for NHS workers.

4.6 The indicators are signs of a person’s beliefs and political views rather than symptomatic of social/medical problems. There are no genuine markers in health terms to indicate the severity of extremism.

4.7 The indicators have not been subjected to analysis that validates any conclusions drawn to prevent accusations of stereotyping and generalisation.

4.8 The indicators are specific to a religious group and do not address extremism in all its forms, (such as the re-emergence of the far right and the ideology that inspired Anders Breivik). They could therefore potentially breach anti-discrimination legislation. It is ironic that PREVENT is being disseminated as law, when in practice it contradicts and breaches anti-discriminatory legislation.
We are not aware of the steps being taken to address vulnerabilities and how successful the outcomes are. What are the markers of a successful intervention? Is there a process that allows a person identified as vulnerable to be taken off a Risk Register? Who decides this? These unanswered questions further substantiate the necessity for transparent policy that allows each affected individual access to the details of their own case.

"Identity Crisis - Adolescents/vulnerable adults who are exploring issues of identity can feel both distant from their parents/family and cultural and religious heritage, and uncomfortable with their place in society around them. Radicalisers can exploit this by providing a sense of purpose or feelings of belonging. Where this occurs, it can often manifest itself in a change in a person’s behaviour, their circle of friends, and the way in which they interact with others and spend their time”.

"Personal crisis - This may, for example, include significant tensions within the family that produce a sense of isolation of the vulnerable individual from the traditional certainties of family life”.

"Personal circumstances - The experience of migration, local tensions or events affecting families in countries of origin may contribute to alienation from UK values and a decision to cause harm to symbols of the community or state”.

"Unemployment or under-employment - Individuals may perceive their aspirations for career and lifestyle to be undermined by limited achievements or employment prospects. This can translate to a generalised rejection of civic life and adoption of violence as a symbolic act”.

"Criminality - In some cases a vulnerable individual may have been involved in a group that engages in criminal activity or, on occasion, a group that has links to organised crime and be further drawn to engagement in terrorist-related activity”.

1.30 Similarly to the above, the following have also been found to contribute to vulnerable people joining certain groups supporting terrorist-related activity:

- Ideology and politics
- Provocation and anger (grievance)
- Need for protection
- Seeking excitement and action
- Fascination with violence, weapons and uniforms
- Youth rebellion
- Seeking family and father substitutes
- Seeking friends and community
- Seeking status and identity.
**Grievances**

1.31 The following are examples of grievances which may play an important part in the early indoctrination of vulnerable individuals into the acceptance of a radical view and extremist ideology:

- A misconception and/or rejection of UK foreign policy
- A distrust of western media reporting
- Perceptions that UK government policy is discriminatory (e.g. counter-terrorist legislation).

**Summary of exploitation**

1.32 Evidence suggests that:

- There is no obvious profile of a person likely to become involved in terrorist-related activity, or a single indicator of when a person might move to support extremism
- Vulnerable individuals who may be susceptible to radicalisation can be patients and/or staff
- Radicalisers often use a persuasive rationale or narrative and are usually charismatic individuals able to attract people to their cause which is based on a particular interpretation or distortion of history, politics or religion
- Factors such as a change in a person’s behaviour may be an example of increased vulnerability
- The particular risks to vulnerable individuals within communities will vary across the country

4.11 As evident in the table, the guidance is very broad and covers behaviours of individuals in all communities, so why is it being specifically targeted at the Muslim community? Their low socio-economic status in the UK makes them more prone to exhibit all these vulnerabilities at some point.

4.12 Considering the current socio-political climate in many Muslim majority countries at present, it is inevitable that comments, opinions and anger about foreign policy and events will be expressed. This exemplifies a defence of human rights and a call for justice, not an indication of radicalisation. Yet such legitimate expressions are sufficient to warrant a referral under Channel.

4.13 The guidance makes clear that vulnerable individuals can be staff i.e. doctors. Since there are thousands of Muslim doctors in the health sector and they are articulate and involved in mosques/charities working overseas, it is inevitable they will be caught up by Channel guidance. Many doctors working in charities overseas are bound to express their feelings and views about the countries they have visited and therefore would be caught up by these guidelines.

4.14 Ironically, a Muslim doctor working for a charity providing medical aid in Syria may well be classed as a supporter of terrorists by the Assad regime. The same doctor expressing upset,
anger and frustration at events whilst in Syria can be referred to the British NHS Channel programme as at risk of extremism and terrorism.

4.15 Channel in the health sector has been implemented without peer review and without adequate scrutiny of outcome measures.

4.16 The policy is ideologically driven rather than evidence based which leads to a significant risk of misuse of public funds.

4.17 The NHS has already been tasked to make £20 billion in savings over the next 5 years and it can ill afford the money budgeted or the time involved in training staff for this ill conceived and poorly researched programme.

4.18 The training material and narratives produced by the PREVENT Health programme are pathologising and criminalising aspects of behaviour practised by many Muslims worldwide that perpetuates ignorance and deepens misunderstanding. This has already resulted in numerous incidents of wrongful arrest and unnecessary interventions.

4.19 This engendering of suspicion in the wider community is detrimental to community cohesion, but is also damaging to the internal working of the NHS as many health care professionals are Muslim and could potentially be the focus of suspicion. CAGE has already received a report that a senior member of staff at an NHS trust was shocked at the stigmatising material in the programme and has written to express their concerns to the CEO.

4.20 The lack of validation of politically loaded terms like “extremism” and “radicalisation” opens the door to abuse, thus furthering personal agendas by closing down scrutiny and due process. Muslim patients have been labelled as “extremists” in areas of divorce and child custody.

4.21 Examples given in the PREVENT Health programme have highlighted a patient with mental illness and another with learning disabilities. This runs counter to national initiatives to stop the marginalisation and stigmatising of patients who are already poorly treated in the NHS.

4.22 Science and medicine must remain free from political and ideological interference. Since PREVENT health was piloted, the DoH has proposed that doctor-patient confidentiality can be breached in matters of public safety/national security. This has been implemented without appropriate discussion between all stakeholders, civil libertarians, ethicists and security service personnel.

A BMA spokeswoman said the plan “goes a lot further and we would have an issue with that. Doctors cannot look into the future and say how someone might behave. This would threaten the trust of the doctor and … patient relationship. A doctor’s role is to treat the patient in front of them, not predict how the patient will behave in future.”
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1:** NHS Discussion on benefits and risks of Channel
  - **Action Step:** Write to professional associations to arrange meetings
  - **Action Step:** Write articles in medical and practice journals

- **AIM 2:** Demand Review and audit of cases by type and outcome
  - **Action Step:** Write to SHA, DoH and Home Office for information
  - **Action Step:** Use Freedom of Information Requests if needed

- **AIM 3:** Create awareness of Channel amongst Muslim doctors.
  - **Action Step:** Training seminars to be held
  - **Action Step:** Information guide produced
Since PREVENT was implemented there have been accusations by the Muslim community that projects funded via PREVENT were shrouded in secrecy and intelligence gathering exercises.

In the initial phase of PREVENT, data collated on project attendees was being held by the Police. In fact, PREVENT Co-ordinators tended to be employed by regional police forces whilst working with local authorities.

Information on projects funded by PREVENT at local authority level was not readily forthcoming because of its unpopularity with Muslim communities. It took a Taxpayers Alliance Freedom of Information request to force local authorities to release information.

Some projects were disingenuously commissioned ostensibly in the interests of the community and yet were in fact intelligence gathering exercises for the Police. The case of the traffic cameras located in a Muslim area of Birmingham, which in fact were collecting car number plate details, has been well publicised.

Less well publicised are the mapping exercises of Muslim organisations in towns and cities carried out under the guise of Muslim community needs research. In fact, they were simply profiling exercises of Islamic groups and their ideological, political and religious views to fit with notions about Islamism and radical groups, drawn from PREVENT theory. These were primarily for the benefit of the authorities and of little use to the Muslim community. The Muslim community of Liverpool wrote to the City Council and objected to the publication of such a report using them as support for the research.

Other instances have been highlighted in the media and in a Institute of Race Relations (IRR) publication "Spooked: how not to PREVENT violent extremism". This claims the PREVENT programme has been used to establish one of the most elaborate systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain.

"In the Midlands, funding for a mental health project to help Muslims was linked to information about individuals being passed to the authorities".

"Within the last month, one new youth project in London alleged it was being pressured by the Metropolitan police to provide names and details of Muslim youngsters, as a condition
of funding. None of the young Muslims have any known terrorist history”.

“In one London borough, those working with youngsters were told to add information to databases they hold to highlight which youths were Muslim. They were also asked to provide information, to be shared with the police, about which streets and areas Muslim youngsters could be found on”.

“A youth project manager alleges his refusal to provide intelligence led to the police spreading false rumours and trying to smear him and his organisation”.

“One manager of a project in London said: “I think part of the point of the [PREVENT] programme is to spy and intelligence gather. I won’t do that.” In another London borough wardens on council estates were told to inform people not whom they suspected of crimes, but whom they suspected could be susceptible to radicalisation. One source, who has been involved in Whitehall discussions on counter-terrorism, said: “There is no doubt PREVENT is in part about gathering intelligence on people’s thoughts and beliefs. No doubt.” He added that the authorities feared “they’d be lynched” if they admitted PREVENT included spying”.  

There have been, and continue to be, concerns regarding PREVENT activity funding. These concerns centre on the lack of openness and transparency concerning how the funding is used. There is concern also at lack of genuine consultation, and an opportunity for people to know which projects are PREVENT or not so they can choose not to be associated if they wish.

Since PREVENT 2011, local authorities and the Police have become more secretive. A request by a Blackburn resident to Blackburn Council for information on who received PREVENT funding, how much, and project names, was refused. The case went to the Information Commission who ruled partly in favour of the applicant but also accepted Blackburn Councils refusal on the grounds of concerns about crime and security. The result was that the resident was provided generic information of activity, with no indication of the recipient or the name of the project.

Muslims have it seems fewer rights to openness, transparency and accountability or even consultation about projects aimed at them, in which they are supposedly beneficiaries. It is an obscure ruling, as local residents may already be aware of the projects and who receives funding. Considering the spurious nature of PREVENT theory and practice it is not surprising that secrecy and Muslim victimisation is the modus operandi of PREVENT. This unjust policy does not foster good relationships between Muslims, local authorities and the Police.

Muslim organisations that receive PREVENT funding are now also demanding secrecy, as making public that they are funded via this source leads to a loss of credibility due to the unpopularity of PREVENT. However this does not justify secrecy and lack of transparency.

Nevertheless the information provided on broad themes by Blackburn Council does indicate types of projects and possibly who is being funded.

It is obvious from this that most projects are run by the Council or by Mosques/faith organisations. These projects are likely to involve training and support around the Channel Project primarily targeted at children and young people. Projects in other towns and cities are likely to be broadly similar.
Since PREVENT 2011, concern about surveillance has increased. It focuses on the way police and security service surveillance and informants are being used, in particular the use of US style entrapment techniques.

The number of informants and the sums paid for their service is causing concern. In direct correlation with the socio-economic climate of many Muslim communities in the UK, there is incentive to provide information in order to receive payment. Moreover, the expectations then placed on the informant’s leaves them in a vulnerable position, whereby providing any form of information, whether sound or unsound, is better than nothing.

Attempts at recruitment are also causing alarm. For example, one individual reported that after signing on for benefits he was approached to spy on another Muslim. Another individual reported that attempts were made to recruit him after he reported a burglary.

There are reports of excessive pressure and threats used against individuals and their families for recruitment purposes, a complaint also made by the killers of Lee Rigby.

Equally worrying is surveillance of the whole community instead of intelligence led surveillance. It was brought to prominence during the Munir Farooqi trial. Concern about a few individuals led to widespread use of undercover Police Officers (pretending to be converts to Islam) at mosques in Manchester. The manner of random questioning to elicit a certain type of response, which is secretly recorded and then used as evidence of support for terrorism, is highly suspect. ¹¹

The techniques used by officers and the theories used to understand Muslim political thought and religious beliefs emanates from the PREVENT theory. This, along with the use of bogus Muslims in mosques, has caused particular anger. ¹²

CAGE has written more extensively about these techniques and held awareness seminars about the tactics.
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1**: Increase awareness of surveillance techniques and entrapment
  - **Action Step**: Public awareness about tactics and how community can protect itself from.
  - **Action Step**: Expose and highlight cases in the media.

- **AIM 2**: Accountability in the use of undercover police and surveillance techniques
  - **Action Step**: Representations to the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
  - **Action Step**: Legal action against police and security services.
6.1 PREVENT is policy, not law. However, the manner of development and application has created a secondary system of law and extra judicial processes applicable primarily to the Muslim community.

6.2 There has been a move away from prosecution for violence to prosecuting or criminalising for ill-defined terms and activities like extremism and now radicalisation.

6.3 Dubious theories of what constitutes causes of “extremism” and “radicalism” derived from neo-conservative think tanks and groups like Quilliam Foundation. These theories are now becoming embedded as the evidential base for both terrorism prosecutions as well as the extra-judicial processes.

6.4 These are being put into practice by local authorities, policy makers and schools and now by doctors.

6.5 This policy effectively declares certain ideas, thoughts and activities as terrorist or leading to terrorism and therefore subversive and illegal/unlawful. Thus, HM government policy paradoxically opposes the democratic values of freedom of speech and expression.

6.6 PREVENT has legitimised the idea of spying on Muslims to monitor their ideas and thoughts in pursuit of tackling extremism.

6.7 The media adds weight to this through selective secret recordings and labelling of “hate” preachers and speeches.

6.8 Although radicalisation and extremism are not against the law when combined with sections 1, 2, 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 they lead to the classification of lawful activities as unlawful and hence terrorism, as defined by the Act.

6.9 PREVENT theory is contributing to the already existing atmosphere of suspicion and censorship. Spying and entrapment are now being used in courts to outlaw ideas, thoughts and practices in order to ban books and materials. Ahmed Faraz, a Birmingham bookseller, was sentenced to imprisonment for stocking DVD’s and books considered terrorist material. Faraz’s subsequent acquittal on appeal highlights the initial injustice and exaggeration of his case. CAGE covered this trial and its potential impact extensively.
In fact, PREVENT has managed to criminalise Scholars from the past, for their ideas from a previous time. Qutb, Mawdudi, speeches of Malcolm X on DVD, and other materials now constitute evidence of one’s links to extremist ideas, making them liable to prosecution for terrorist accusations.

Courts are now defining what Muslims can read and see, thus monitoring what is allowed within Islam, using “expert” witnesses who agree with the PREVENT narrative. They have the authority to define genuine Islam and the delineation of extremism. These theories are then presented as evidence, when in fact they are no more than opinions.

It is difficult to employ defence experts that challenge this because for the most part these individuals will be subject to scrutiny of their ideas, views, personal life and financial affairs by the police.

Entrapment prosecutions, secret recordings and carefully de-contextualised statements, in conjunction with an examination of people’s ideas, showing DVD’s and images that most non-Muslims and jurors have never been exposed to, are naturally found alarming and dangerous. Furthermore, the complexity of religious comment, language or phraseology that has specific context and meaning in the Muslim community may not be understood by those unaware of Islamic principles. The prosecution understanding is naturally more likely to be accepted given fears of terrorism.

The use of secret converts and recordings have been utilised in the media. This is controversial and misrepresentative as comments are misinterpreted and taken out of context. They are then presented on television as evidence of “extremism”. This is similar to the police activity and prosecutions taking place under these sections of the acts.

It is possible to make one comment on one day out of hours of recordings and for this to be sufficient as evidence of intent of extremism and terrorism.

The defence team does not have access to the whole recordings to select comments that paint a different picture.

The recordings are sent to the Intelligence team for analysis. It is likely that their knowledge and ability to interpret what has been said is based on PREVENT theory. Just like juries, they are unlikely to have access to the religious understanding and community knowledge necessary to put comments in their appropriate context.

There are concerns at how judgments are made in reference to materials classed as “terrorist”? What is the legal definition of this? Whilst one may be involved in radicalisation, that does not mean support or endorsement of violence. Is expression or support for legitimate resistance to occupation classed as grooming and terrorism? It is certainly classed as extremism under PREVENT. If so, the law is only being selectively applied: to Muslims and very few non-Muslims who support the right to resist occupation.

So called terrorist materials are graded into tiers. Talk of terrorist materials may give the impression of dangerous plots. This may be the case in some instances, but increasingly it is to do with books, DVDS, internet speeches and other non-lethal materials. The use of tier 1, 2, and 3 classifications of materials for prosecution methods needs examination and critical review.
The concept of grooming and preparing someone with knowledge and spiritually for Jihad is dubious. Can it be said that in all cases making a statement such as, “I’d better get you some Awlaki,” means a preparation for Jihad. Or that asking someone to study certain chapters of the Quran prior to a visit to Pakistan is evidence of intent to commit violence?

The use and testing of codes on targets by the security services to prove terrorist activity is insubstantial and intangible. If a target understands the code the agent uses, does that prove they are terrorists? Going on holiday means going for Jihad. Marriage means Shaheed. The weather indicates whether it is hot or cold on the ground.

Why can the use of entrapment only be put forward to the judge and not to jury as a defence? In the Farooqi case this was put to the jury and the judge threw it out.

The level of proof required in section 5 of the terrorism act is less than that required for normal criminal law. Normally, proof of harm is required but in this section of the law proof of potential danger is sufficient. PREVENT theory has already declared radicalism and extremism as dangerous.

Maximum life sentence is possible under section 58, for what can actually be political comment and material. This is unwarranted and excessive.

There is no consistency of law. Involvement in violence/military activities is acceptable for some British citizens not others. Libyans who went to fight against Gaddafi were not prosecuted. British Jews who train and probably fight in conflicts in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon are not considered for prosecution under the act.

The extreme right wing has produced dangerous publications and violent comment on their websites but are not prosecuted using these sections of the law, or defined as “terrorist” material. Many recordings on YouTube are much more dangerous than comments or material disseminated by Muslims. This confirms the discriminatory nature of this policy, as it is selectively applied to certain groups and not others.

The diagram on page 29 illustrates how PREVENT and Terrorism Laws are being used to prosecute individuals and criminalise a particular community.
The Manufacture of Terrorism:

**Creating Climate**
Media Stories on Islam, extremism and hate preachers

Think Tanks declare who and what is extremism and dangerous. Produce “experts”.

**Creating Theoretical Framework**
Govt PREVENT Policies legitimise theories about extremism and what is genuine Islam.

**The Legal Framework**

**Thought Crimes – No Plot**
Courts implement PREVENT ideas using Supporting/expressing support for Terrorism defined by Sections 1, 2, 5, and 58

Glorification of resistance; adopting a ideology, promotion of ideology, grooming others to adopt, DVD’s books, comments, recitations, downloading internet. Ideas and theories in PREVENT and media about extremism and experts.

**Preparation for a Plot**
Preparing for the act of Terrorism

Prefering the act of Terrorism

**The Actual Plot**
Planning or committing act of violence or attack.

Plane tickets, making arrangements, making a video, contacts, purchasing other materials for bombs, attacks etc.
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1**: Increase knowledge base of terrorism prosecutions under section 5 and 58.
  - **Action Step**: Bring lawyers involved together to share knowledge.
  - **Action Step**: Publish papers on cases.

- **AIM 2**: AIM 2: Develop experts and advisers pool.
  - **Action Step**: Develop a pool of CAGE approved lawyers and experts with understanding of Islamic issues and materials.
THE PREVENT STRATEGY:
A CRADLE TO GRAVE POLICE-STATE
Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows for individuals to be stopped, questioned or detained by an examining officer at ports/airports if it is believed they are engaged in acts of terrorism.

Since its introduction the Act has been so widely used and abused that being stopped and sharing experiences of this has become part of daily life for Muslims.

Schedule 7 is a stop power with minimum legal safeguards.

Those stopped are not arrested but can be held for up to nine hours in the absence of a solicitor and without anyone else present (a current Parliamentary Bill proposes a reduction to 6 hours and some right to legal representation). This amount of time is unreasonable and excessive, especially as the nature of questioning often centres upon religious and political attitudes, not on suspicion of a legitimate terrorist threat. However, a recent successful case has strengthened the possibility that legal representation will be allowed.

No reasonable grounds for suspicion are needed to stop someone. The Bill did not propose any change to this despite representations by Muslim groups. However, the detention of David Miranda, partner of Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald, for nine hours brought media publicity to the intrusive and unjust nature of Schedule 7 stops. It has now been proposed that some grounds for suspicion before stops must be introduced.

Whilst this is welcome, it is indicative of the dual nature of justice in Britain today. The experiences of thousands of Muslims suffering from Schedule 7 abuses of power are neglected by society and government officials. However, the experience of one non-Muslim being stopped drew huge amounts of media attention and outrage from the public. The exact same treatment of human life is seen differently depending on whether someone is Muslim or non-Muslim.

Individuals questioned do not have the right to remain silent and can be strip searched, have samples taken for DNA and fingerprints taken. Belongings can be searched and taken for further examination for 7 days.

There were 63,902 stops in 2011-12, with only 680 detentions resulting in further investigation. There are no figures for arrests. Of those stopped, 50% were Asian or Black, with 27% others. Asian people were 11.3 times, and Pakistani people 52 times more likely...
to be stopped than white people. Therefore, it is highly likely the majority of those stopped were Muslims, proving the unlawful and discriminatory nature of the Act based on religious and ethnic stereotyping. The figures show that the powers are being applied arbitrarily and far too extensively. 16

7.9 We believe that ‘screening stops’ are not recorded in official figures, only ‘examinations’, which are detentions of the passenger for detailed questioning. The faith of the individual is not officially recorded, despite the blatant importance of one’s religious affiliation when being questioned. Recording all stops including ‘screening stops’ and officially recording ones faith would show the true scale of Muslim passenger profiling taking place.

7.10 Passengers are often stopped and questioned to gain information about their religious and political views and associations. The questions are in line with PREVENT theory and logic mentioned elsewhere in this report, and are often basic, trivial and irrelevant. It appears that Schedule 7 is being used to gather intelligence on particular communities.

7.11 The removal and copying of mobile phone sim data and the installation of listening devises has been reported by those who have stopped.

7.12 Passengers or their phone contacts are often approached by police/security officers, sometimes days and weeks after their return. They are asked to be ‘information providers’ or to be used formally as Covert Human Intelligence Sources. There are indications that such practices are still in use that employ threats and intimidation.

7.13 The separate questioning of husband and wife/children has been reported with attempts to draw differing statements.

Those stopped have complained they have missed flights and holidays/honeymoons. There is no mechanism for complaint or receiving compensation for financial loss as travel insurance does not cover stop and search interference.

7.14 A major concern is that the names of those stopped appear on security lists, with no mechanism for removal, even if no charge has been made.
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1**: Make Muslim communities resilient to schedule 7
- **Action Step**: Continue CAGE schedule 7 seminars and training
- **Action Step**: Support legal challenges
Government discussions around PREVENT 2011 included plans for banning non-violent or extremist Muslim groups and speakers, especially at Universities and other public venues.

Whilst these proposals were not advanced officially, a back door non-judicial approach to preventing speakers who are labelled extremist, or not considered to be upholding “fundamental British Values” involving the Police, Universities and the Charity Commission, has been operating. There is even suspicion that an unofficial list of undesirable speakers already exists.  

8.1 Universities have now effectively become the frontline in the implementation of PREVENT Policy with PREVENT Co-ordinators being based or focused around them, working closely with other agencies. 

8.2 CAGE has analysed the modus operandi of these back door bans of “extremist” or “radical” speakers and event cancellations of which there have been many. A clear pattern emerges which suggests there is a policy to disrupt Islamic events and discredit/silence speakers from public life. The following is a typical scenario:

- A student/student body/ external organisation books venue.
- Everything is fine until nearer the time of the event.
- A hostile right wing/neo con websites or groups label speakers as hate preachers and starts a campaign to cancel event.
- Information is passed to University or venue.
- University receives complaints from campaigners.
- University consults Police does Google search on speakers/group
- Police advice that speakers are “controversial”
- University cancels event due to speakers.

8.3 This type of disruptive activity has been the hallmark of state policies in preventing pro communist and black civil rights groups in the US. There was even sponsorship of anti-black and anti-communist organisations/publications similar to today’s anti-Islamic websites and campaign groups.

8.4 Stopping Muslim speakers and cancelling events on grounds of “extremism” has become the norm. Many events have been cancelled and those affected have been denied information by both the Universities and the Police as to the underlying causes.
8.7 We believe these cancellations are unjustified and a violation of a universities duty to protect freedom of expression under the Education Act 1986.

8.8 A similar modus operandi exists with the booking of private conference facilities for Muslim events, where pressure is applied on the venue owners by right wing groups. In many cases we have been informed by the Police and PREVENT Officers. Venue owners then cancel.

8.9 The result is that Muslims find it difficult to hold or plan events due to lack of access to venues willing to host.

8.10 The advice police are giving to Universities and the pressure being applied to venue owners does not seem to centre on fears or risks of spreading violent ideologies. The behaviour of Police officers and the advice they are giving on non-criminal matters is restricting freedom of speech, and embedding institutionalised discrimination towards Muslim communities’ religious views and political opinions.

8.11 The absence of the right to challenge and redress, as well as the lack of information for reasons of cancellations is leading to reputational damage for many organisations and the effective banning of many speakers from public life.

8.12 The 2013 proposals will, if implemented, go one step further by issuing extremism orders against individuals or groups considered radical. This will effectively stop those who have orders against them from carrying out activities like public speaking or publishing on the Internet. A breach of the order will lead to prosecution. This will effectively criminalise non-criminal activity of a person who has never been convicted of a crime.
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1**: Challenge University Decisions that cancel events
  - **Action Step**: Establish facts and cases
  - **Action Step**: Support legal challenges-judicial review in high court

- **AIM 2**: Strengthen Muslim students and groups
  - **Action Step**: Provide training
  - **Action Step**: Support Universities
Mosques and Charities

9.1 Mosques and charities are major institutions in Muslim communities. They represent substantial investments of Muslim wealth over decades.

9.2 Mosques have always been a key focus of PREVENT, both in terms of pressure on management committees, regulation, and also of state interference in preaching of religion. Efforts to create a “moderate” or non-political version of Islam were taking place long before 9/11.

9.3 Mosques have been the subjects of scrutiny for some time now, with regular visits from the police. They have tended to be very co-operative, without realising the future implications on freedoms and rights of Muslims.

9.4 However, police pressure has been applied to mosque committees and gone well beyond concerns about terrorism. It has involved concerns about speakers and the content of their speeches and even who should be allowed to leaflet outside mosques despite the fact that streets outside the mosques are not mosque property or responsibility.

9.5 The elderly nature of most mosque committees makes them very compliant, without challenging police advice. Many mosques have simply limited themselves to insignificant events or activities which are irrelevant and unattractive to young Muslims.

9.6 An early attempt at regulation of mosques was the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). Although presenting itself as an independent attempt at self regulation it initially received funding from PREVENT. It has focused primarily on PREVENT priorities and concerns.

9.7 A great deal of PREVENT related Police advice and involvement with mosques has been centred on identifying extremism. Primarily, identifying and informing police and excluding known “extremists” and groups from visiting, speaking, or leafleting outside mosques.

9.8 This has been supplemented in recent years by the use of paid informants who attend and report on everything that is going on. In some cases these informants are bogus Muslims.

9.9 Most mosques are registered charities. The Charity Commission’s increased regulatory interventions around “extremism” and requirements for speaker policies has brought added tensions.

9.10 It is the role of the mosque to provide guidance on Islamic issues and preach on matters of social/political issues, personal life and issues of sexuality, morals and behaviours; even if these values are not accepted by secular society at large. This is in direct contradiction to the PREVENT policy and its definition of extremism which is now about fundamental “British values”.

THE PREVENT STRATEGY: A CRADLE TO GRAVE POLICE-STATE
As a result many mosques are now actively considering whether being a registered charity is in conflict with their ability to practice and preach their faith.

The Charity Commission has also intervened in mosque fundraising. It has raised questions of who can and cannot collect at mosques and how those funds should be paid out. The Imam of one mosque in the North West recently spoke in a Friday Khutba about the visit of the Charity Commission and how they told them to take control of fundraising at their mosque.

The 2013 proposals will allow for greater restrictions on activity and more intrusive monitoring by the Police and Charity Commission in Mosques and charities.

There are hundreds of Muslim charities in the UK. Charitable giving is a pillar of the Islamic faith. The Muslim community has generally had a good relationship with the Charity Commission and has been very supportive of its role in bringing about good governance, and accountability/transparency in raising and disbursing of funds.

However, since 9/11 Muslim charities have started to be viewed through the lens of terrorism. Some oppressive states actively attempt to restrict Muslim humanitarian interventions in order to substantiate links between aid work and extremism. For example, extreme rightwing neo-conservative commentators have made unsubstantiated assertions regarding links between Muslim charities and terrorist finance, thus creating fear and suspicion even around Muslim charity work.

These accusations normally result in intervention by the Charity Commission. There are concerns that these interventions resulting from media intrusion are not inquisitive of the veracity of the media source itself, thus resulting in unnecessary interference that damages the reputation of these charities.

The involvement of the Charity Commission in PREVENT is not new. PREVENT helped establish a Faith Unit within it. The aim was mainly to provide support to Muslim charities to improve governance. This unit has now been disbanded.

The Charity Commission has embraced PREVENT fully (providing more detailed guidance on preventing extremism January 2013) with the appointment of a new Chairman. Now much greater intervention amongst Muslim Charities appears to be taking place. This is evident in the Commissions latest report as the figures below highlight:-

In 2012-13 concerns about abuse of charities for terrorist purposes featured in:

- 1 report of a serious incident
- 1 whistleblowing report
- 29 completed pre-investigation assessment cases
- 37 monitoring cases
- 4 statutory inquiry cases, 2 of which were new cases opened during the year
- A total of 1,539 disclosures took place between the Commission and other agencies.
- Of these overall exchanges 196, or 13%, related to terrorism and extremism issues:
- 83 Section 54 disclosures to the Commission
- 113 Section 56 disclosures made by the Commission.
9.19 The Commission is now collaborating more closely with Universities, PREVENT coordinators and the Police in monitoring Muslim Charities for matters of extremism rather than governance and financial irregularities. This is represented by the figures. There were 83 terrorism related disclosures of information made by other agencies to the Commission, while it made 113 disclosures to other agencies itself. The labelling of figures is misleading as many of these cases are likely to be for extremism not terrorism as stated in their table. It has become evidently clear that the extremism is now synonymous with terrorism.

9.20 There are now many charities being contacted, visited and investigated as a result of hostile reports of Islamic activities and personalities. Media and right wing websites alleging extremism and links to terrorism play a major role in these interventions. The following is a typical scenario for a Commission intervention.

- Charity holds fundraising event books, with speakers.
- Right wing/neo con websites post comments claiming extremism
- Or public story about the charity in press or TV.
- Or CC receives phone call from PREVENT or Police officer.
- CC writes to charity to visit to see if they are acting in public interest
- CC insist on speaker and extremism policy
- CC examines management of charity

9.21 There are accusations that Police and the Charity Commission are colluding to put pressure on Muslim charities, stopping them from hosting speakers and events labelled as extremist or radical.

9.22 The appointment of William Shawcross as Chair of the Commission (a neo-conservative right wing writer/journalist and Director of the neo-conservative Henry Jackson Society until his appointment as Chair) has caused alarm amongst Muslim communities. It is questionable as to whether the Commission can be genuinely independent when dealing with Muslim charities under his leadership. 20

9.23 It is not the purpose of this paper to go into the views of Shawcross. They are widely available, however, they are seen as pro-Israel, pro-Guantanamo, anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim Brotherhood. More importantly for this paper, his ideology and narrative in relation to extremism/radicalisation and Muslim violence are consistent with PREVENT theory. ‘Islamism’ is understood as a global ideology, desiring global domination (similar to communism or Nazism). Furthermore, influential scholars such as Qutb, and prominent organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood are branded as extremist, directly associating Muslim schools of thought and institutional organisations with terrorism.

9.24 Charities working in Palestine and with Muslim Brotherhood origins should be concerned about the Charity Commissions impartiality. Shawcross’ recent comments about Muslim charities and unsubstantiated claims of links to terrorists have been received very badly in the charity sector. 21
ACTION PLAN

• **AIM 1:** Monitor and Analyse Charity Commission interventions
  • **Action Step:** Research on Charity Commission interventions.
  • **Action Step:** Challenges to Charity Commission practices where necessary.

• **AIM 2:** strengthen and make resilient mosques and Muslim charities.
  • **Action Step:** Provide training to the sectors.
  • **Action Step:** Provide expertise and support to those investigated.
Although not part of the PREVENT proposals, the theory and implementation processes of citizenship removal follow the PREVENT policy narrative. Removal of passports and citizenship from British Muslims with dual nationality is becoming commonplace, even for those born here.

The British Home Secretary under the British Nationality Act can strip people of their citizenship if they are dual nationals, arguing their presence in the UK is “not conducive to the public good”.

Twenty people have had their citizenship revoked in 2013 and 37 since May 2010. Almost all of them have been Muslim. Five of the cases have involved British born individuals.

As with aspects of PREVENT, revoking someone’s citizenship can be done without a judicial process. The person involved does not have to be suspected or convicted of any crime. Often mere suspicion is sufficient.

The main grounds for concluding someone’s presence is not conducive to the public good. It is based on national security and suspicion of involvement in extremist activities.

The Home Secretary simply issues the deprivation order, and in all but two cases this has happened whilst the individual is overseas, making it impossible to return to the country. There is a process of appeal but this can take years, making access to legal representation and action difficult.

This policy has potential implications for every Muslim with a dual nationality. It assumes that Muslims who go to conflict zones are in some way linked to extremist or terrorists groups and activities. We know that many Muslims are active in charitable and Islamic religious activities. An accusation could be made and order issued against anyone the Home Secretary does not particularly like, or receives malicious or politically motivated complaint about.

As well as citizenship deprivation, the Home Secretary can on the same grounds confiscate someone’s passport, stopping them from any travel, henceforth negating activities they do not wish them to engage in.

The policy fails to recognise the realities of life for British Muslims. Muslims with British citizenship originate from all parts of the world. When there is conflict in their mother
countries, such as Syria, they will of course want to help and many will return to their country of origin to do so. This does not mean they are returning to fight. However, a deprivation order based on the say so of the Home Secretary’s suspicions without judicial process puts all dual citizens at risk.

10.10 If the 2013 proposals are implemented then those dual nationals who have an Extremism Order issued against them will be liable to have their British citizenship revoked at any time, under the pretence that their presence is not conducive to the public good.

10.11 This policy also creates an unequal system of law for dual national Muslims and others. Other communities such as British Jews with dual Israeli citizenship who go to fight in Israel’s wars are unlikely to be affected.
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1**: Challenge the policy and processes
- **Action Step**: Legal challenges where possible.
- **Action Step**: Create more awareness.
Financial Services

11.1 HM Treasury is responsible for the implementation and administration of international financial sanctions in the UK, and for domestic designations under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010. The treasury licenses exemptions to financial sanctions, and directions given under Schedule 7 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.

11.2 Alongside the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) an intergovernmental policy making body sets anti-terrorist financing and anti-money laundering standards, including recommended regulations for the non-profit sector, used by over 180 countries. It is a voluntary organization without any enforcement capability, and recommendations are not a binding international obligation. However, it pressures countries to adopt its strict standards and regulatory practices.

11.3 The international sanctions relate to countries, individuals and terrorist designated or related organisations. On the other hand, criminal and financial laws and regulatory practices relate to the credit and financial institutions. In some countries these new rules are used to buttress repressive regimes and restrict the political and humanitarian space in which non-profit organisations and charities operate.

11.4 After the UN financial sanctions regime has been implemented, the banking industry in particular has played a prominent role alongside counter-terrorism units within governments.

11.5 Terrorism laws have been misused by the UK government to seize the assets of the Icelandic bank Landsbanki.²³

11.6 In relation to Muslim clients, the banks are often willing to freeze the assets of individuals or organisations, merely on the sway of the authorities, or third party complaints, without requiring any specific evidence of wrongdoing.

11.7 The PREVENT strategy has gone further than the originally intended sanctions regime. Currently, banks will close the accounts of those the UK police and security agencies deem to be of interest.

11.8 There is no due process in this system. The bank will be approached and made aware of concerns, and this will be followed by an arbitrary decision by the bank to close. Due to the lack of regulation of the sector, there is no requirement for the bank to explain why the bank was closed, only that they had made such a decision.
11.9 In 2011, the Islamic Bank of Britain arbitrarily decided to close the bank account of CAGE, resulting in the loss of £800 per month in standing orders. The letter the organisation received explained the bank was not obliged to provide any reason for the closure. Sources close to CAGE within the bank explained pressure was being mounted by agencies within government for this closure, and that they felt compelled to comply.

11.10 Other Muslim charities and organisations have suffered a similar fate, notably Islamic Relief and a charity operating in Somalia which recently managed to overturn the decision, demonstrating that legal action is potentially a way forward.

11.11 It is evident that the banking sector will begin to play a more influential role in the implementation of PREVENT, as UK government policy will require institutions to be more aggressive in undermining what they deem to be ‘extremist’ activity, regardless of the extent such claims have been tested. 24
ACTION PLAN

- **AIM 1**: More information is needed in this area
- **Action Step**: Collate more information on cases.
- **Action Step**: Analyse trends, processes and issues
12.1 The PREVENT definition of extremism states; “Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.

12.2 The theory and operation of the PREVENT policy contradicts this statement. Much of it is shrouded in secrecy, operates outside the rule of law (without due process) and violates individual liberty. It gives the State unrestricted intrusive powers into the lives of a minority community and faith; restricting their freedoms of belief, expression and association.

12.3 The causal analysis and policy prescription that runs throughout PREVENT is itself deeply anti-libertarian, authoritarian and rooted in an extremist ideology.

12.4 Whilst at the moment this policy targets and impacts the minority Muslim community and draws little criticism, there is a real danger to wider society and democracy from the PREVENT narrative and practice.

12.5 Once precedents for law and policy are established against one community, they become in theory applicable to all. PREVENT is a political programme.

12.6 Having established mechanisms for clamping down on people’s political values, beliefs and expressions, and having determined socially acceptable behaviour and activity, the State can implement the same principles to other communities that come to pose a ‘threat’.

12.7 Public Service officers and local councils being politicised in PREVENT delivery will no doubt think it appropriate to interfere and restrict others with political beliefs and values. Local council officers in Rotherham thought it right to discriminate against someone because of their membership of UKIP, in the fostering and adoption service. This contradicts the public services condition of promoting equal opportunity policies. 25

12.8 The acceptance of extra judicial processes as a way to control people’s lives and behaviour and subsequently to criminalise them can be applied to other social policies. For example, if the Channel programme can be used to predict people’s future propensity to violence, why not use it to predict future sexual and domestic violence against women?

12.9 Terror laws and restrictions are already being used against other groups such as environmental and animal rights campaigners and protestors to stop activism rather than violence and to
seize the assets of a bank, Landsbanki.

12.10 Schedule 7 stops and passport confiscation can be used against investigative journalists and other activists trying to expose the activities of the state as we have already highlighted.

12.11 The use of undercover officers and entrapment, even to the extent of having sex with environmental activist has already been widely exposed. 26

12.12 We believe that wider society should be much more concerned with the implications of PREVENT on individual freedoms and liberty. PREVENT is portrayed through the guise of a policy that protects British democratic values and the security of British citizens. In reality, PREVENT presents a danger to the essence of democracy, and manipulates the public into believing they are safe and protected from threats. In fact, the public is under tight scrutiny and control.

12.13 It is ironic that whilst the British government demands a commitment from its Muslim citizens to democracy and the rule of law, its main policy towards Muslims has precisely the opposite effect. Namely, that democracy and the rule of law is less applicable to Muslims than other citizens.
Conclusion

13.1 We believe that the PREVENT Policy is unnecessary. It criminalises, stigmatises and alienates the entire Muslim community. It is an unnecessary intrusion into the religious and political beliefs of Muslims. It encourages discrimination and erodes fundamental rights and due process. It is not needed as there is sufficient scope within law to pursue and prosecute those plotting violence. We will encourage the Muslim community to work towards repeal of this policy.

13.2 We do not accept the Government's narrative and terminology in relation to “terrorism”, “extremism”, and “Islamism”. We believe that violence perpetrated by Muslims in this context is politically motivated. The current legal definition of “terrorism” is drawn too widely. In the past this definition was focussed on politically motivated violence. We believe the term Politically Motivated Violence (PMV) is more accurate, less emotive and promotes a more rational discourse about the nature of violence in the Muslim world. It also eliminates the false notion that Islamic theology is the root cause of Muslim violence. Equally terms such as extremism, radicalism, and Islamism are meaningless terms without definition. We will develop and promote our own narrative and terminology.

13.3 PREVENT is the first UK policy that encompasses every aspect of Muslim life. In this paper we have touched upon major areas of concern.

13.4 There are many others that have not been examined here, such as PREVENT in Madrassahs, where a curriculum has been developed using PREVENT funding to teach the “correct” version of Jihad and Islam. PREVENT targets and trains Muslim women (the Shanaz project) to spot signs of extremism amongst their husbands and children. There is international PREVENT activity too. PREVENT is present and functioning in prisons (CONTEST programme). This has recently been exposed for failing to change the political ideas of 110 of 150 people going through the programme. 27

13.5 We have compared the theory and implementation of PREVENT to the strategy adopted by the West to try and defeat Communism. In PREVENT, we also find similarities with the extra-judicial witch-hunts against those suspected of communist links, during the McCarthy era. However, McCarthyite policies and practices did not target a whole community and encompass all areas of life. There has truly been nothing like PREVENT in recent Western history, and it is being expanded constantly as the 2013 proposals show.
PREVENT is no longer about terrorism and violence. It is about ideology, beliefs and values. Its narrative uses phrases such as, “extremism”, “radical”, “Al Qaeda and like minded individuals/groups”, “opposition to fundamental British values”. These can potentially encapsulate all Muslims.

PREVENT is also a state sponsored attempt to manufacture and sponsor a particular brand of Islam.

The PREVENT narrative concerning Islam, the causes of Muslim violence, extremism, the nature of Muslim groups/organisations and interpretation of comments and historical texts has been adopted from the works of extremist right wing Neo Conservatives in the US.

This narrative has been adopted uncritically (often accompanied by training) by officers from local authorities, teachers, universities, the Police and even judges. This narrative promotes the notion that they now have some expertise of Muslim life, Islam and extremism. Armed with this limited narrative, public sectors officers have become politicised into making decisions that have a detrimental effect on Muslims, often leading to prosecution.

There is no social scientific rigour or evidence base to this theory and approach.

These decisions are often made (as in the McCarthy era) via secretive extra judicial processes without due process, the right of appeal or even the right to information. Effectively this amounts to legislating and banning through the back door without going through the scrutiny of a parliamentary process.

There is no accepted or legal definition of extremism or radicalism.

The definition of extremism in the policy argues that it undermines loyalty to the concept of democracy and the rule of law from Muslims; PREVENT policy itself sends a message to Muslims that the rule of law and democracy does not apply to them and that they do not have the same rights and freedoms as others.

PREVENT (unlike most laws) is selective and retrospective by making judgments about people’s views, comments, what they read and beliefs and ideas even from the past, rather than after the introduction of laws.

The application of PREVENT is eroding basic rights and freedoms of Muslims such as freedom of expression, belief and association.

The precedents PREVENT has set are being applied elsewhere. For example, employers are now searching the Internet before they employ Muslims to see whether they have “extremist” views.

The inability to access basic information and reasons for denial and redress are causing much anger, resentment and frustration in the community.

Muslim socio-economic life is being over regulated by the state. This is affecting economic development and restricting political, business and social life.

We are concerned that this is being accepted as normal practice by wider society and the anger that it is creating will lead not to less violence and extremism, but may cause a reactionary turn towards it.
13.20 The restrictions on religious and political expression and activity have closed the space for normal expression of discontent and anger about certain issues and will encourage more people to look elsewhere for outlets.

13.21 Instead of talking about foreign policy radicalising Muslims in the future we may well be talking about domestic policy radicalising Muslims.

13.22 Being Muslim in Britain today means you are on trial whatever you are doing. Someone, somewhere, is making a judgement about your beliefs and values. Ultimately, the government has enforced such strict surveillance and interference in the lives of all British Muslims that it is promoting a view that all Muslims are guilty, unless they can prove their innocence. For one community to be so targeted and victimised by the infrastructure of the government necessitates a response from every community in British society.

13.23 Opposing, challenging and resisting these injustices through increased activism, campaigning and legal challenges is the only way Muslim communities are going to secure their rights and equal treatment.
Endnotes

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